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Abstract: A growing number of mainland Chinese real estate firms went public over the past 
decade.  Some floated their shares in Hong Kong, while others were listed on mainland stock 
exchanges.  This paper empirically examines the determinants of their initial public offering 
(IPO) location choice.  Based on probit analysis, we found that developers with better 
unobserved quality are more likely to list in Hong Kong than in the mainland.  State ownership, 
gearing ratio, and property market performance are other significant determinants of IPO 
locations.  A further test shows that the degree of IPO underpricing is larger for firms listed in 
mainland China than those listed in Hong Kong.  All these findings are consistent with the 
signaling hypothesis – good firms signal their quality to investors by listing in market with 
more stringent regulatory environment where other firms cannot afford to imitate. 
 
Keywords: IPO, location, signaling, underpricing 
 
  
3 
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Real estate development has played an important role in China’s economic growth.  With 
the opening up of China since the 1980s, more than 50 real estate developers in mainland China 
have made initial public offerings (IPOs) on either the Hong Kong stock exchange or the two 
mainland stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen. 1   The former is a well-known 
international stock market established under British rule in the 19th century, whereas the latter 
is a relatively new but fast-growing stock market under the so-called socialist market economic 
system.  As of the end of 2011, the market capitalization of the Hong Kong stock exchange 
was US$2,300 billion (world no.6), whereas the aggregate size of the two mainland exchanges 
was US$3,400 billion (world no.5 and 12).  In terms of capital raised in 2010, Hong Kong, 
Shenzhen, and Shanghai’s stock exchanges were ranked the first, second, and fourth, 
respectively (New York was the third).2   
Mainland firms were undoubtedly one of the key drivers of these fund-raising activities, 
and firms in the real estate sector were often the market focus.  Regarding the choice of IPO 
locations, an article in Financial Times reported that “a number of privately owned Chinese 
property developers have opted to list in Hong Kong”.3  But in the Data section, we will see 
that among 57 mainland developers, half of them floated their shares in Hong Kong and the 
other half stayed in the mainland market.  What are the main reasons for their choices of IPO 
location?  This paper attempts to answer this question.  By focusing on real estate companies, 
we are able to use price indices in the private property market to account for changes in the 
market value of their underlying assets and test if property market conditions would alter their 
IPO location choice.  It is important to note that our subject is always mainland developers, i.e. 
                                                          
1 “Mainland China” or simply “mainland” refers to China excluding Hong Kong. 
2 Global IPO trends 2011, Ernst & Young, page 4. 
3 “Excellence plans HK listing”, Financial Times, October 14, 2007. 
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no Hong Kong developers are included.   
Firm characteristics and stock market performance aside, we are particularly interested in 
whether the reputation of an IPO location matters.  While some financial information is 
revealed through the IPO process, a firm often has private information on its asset quality or 
future prospects that cannot be credibly observed by potential investors.  Listing in a reputable 
market is a way to convey such private information to investors.  Comparing the Hong Kong 
and mainland markets, the former is regarded as more reputable because of its more mature 
legal system with stringent listing rules and enforcement.4  Firms listed in Hong Kong are 
subject to a higher degree of information disclosure so that investors there suffer less from 
asymmetric information.5  This gives incentives to high quality firms – those whose market 
value is likely to be underestimated by investors – to issue shares in Hong Kong in order to 
signal their unobserved quality.  In contrast, low quality firms are better off conducting IPOs 
in mainland China in order to avoid disclosing their unobserved quality.   
There is anecdotal evidence that the reputation of an IPO location matters.  Some big 
mainland developers reportedly chose Hong Kong for their IPOs because its stock market 
would help them promote their image to the rest of the financial world.6  Of course, apart from 
reputation, developers also have other considerations before choosing their IPO locations.  For 
example, they may prefer to list in a location with relatively better stock market sentiment or 
local property market conditions.  Whether the developer is state or privately owned may also 
                                                          
4 According to World Economic Forum, Hong Kong ranked the first in financial development due to its strong 
tax regime, highly developed infrastructure, etc., whereas mainland China ranked 19th.  [please include the 
reference/website] The World Bank’s governance indicators also show that Hong Kong scored much higher 
than mainland China in terms of regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (91‐99.5 in Hong 
Kong vs 32.5‐45 in mainland China) [please include the reference/website]. 
5 The market was reportedly concerned about Mainland firms’ corporate governance and financial reporting 
standard, especially when auditors unexpectedly quitted their jobs.  Recently, a Mainland firm listed in Hong 
Kong said it could not provide the auditor with details because its business involves state secrets.  
Consequently, the Hong Kong regulator suspended its trading. 
6 Southern Metropolis Daily, August 28, 2007. 
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matter.  These factors will be accounted for when analyzing IPO location choices. 
As the first step of analyzing IPO location choices, we need a measure of a firm’s private 
information on unobserved quality.  Ideally, it is a firm’s expectations of its future, post-IPO 
performance, but this information is bound to be unknown or unreliable; otherwise, no 
information asymmetry between a firm and its prospective investors would have arisen.  
Without any reliable measure of ex ante performance, we constructed three proxies based on 
the unexpected component of a firm’s post-IPO performance.  Two of them are conventional 
measures of abnormal share price returns: the Sharpe Ratio and Jensen’s alpha.  They represent 
the risk-adjusted performance of a firm and are ex post measures of the firm’s performance 
relative to that of the stock market.  We assume that a firm’s observed quality has been fully 
reflected by its initial stock price, so any future abnormal returns it earns could serve as a proxy 
for unobserved quality.  The third proxy is the post-IPO abnormal profit return.  It is defined 
as the residual component of return-on-asset that is not attributable to property market 
performance, ownership structure, or capital structure.  It can be regarded as an ex post measure 
of a firm’s unobserved operating performance. 
In the second step, we used a Probit model to verify if the above proxies for a firm’s 
unobserved quality impacted a firm’s IPO location choice.  Consistent with the signaling theory, 
we found that mainland developers with better unobserved quality were more likely to list in 
Hong Kong.  In addition, some firm characteristics and market conditions also mattered.  
Developers with state ownership or less leverage (i.e., liabilities/assets ratio before IPOs) were 
more likely to conduct IPOs in mainland China.  Property market conditions were also a factor: 
when mainland property prices increased, developers were more likely to conduct their IPOs 
in mainland China. 
After the above analysis, we further tested if firms listed in different stock markets had 
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distinct IPO underpricing patterns.  The literature suggested that high quality firms may use 
IPO underpricing to signal their unobserved quality when there is information asymmetry 
(Welch, 1989; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Boulton et al., 2011).  
By implication, listing in a more reputable market should enable a firm to underprice less.  To 
test this, we calculated an IPO underpricing ratio by using the offer price from each IPO’s 
prospectus and the closing prices on days of each IPO.  Consistent with the signaling theory, 
we found that developers listed in the mainland market, which suffers more from information 
asymmetry, had a larger degree of underpricing after controlling for stock market returns during 
their IPOs and other firm characteristics. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on 
signaling and highlights the contributions of this paper.  Section 3 describes the data and 
methodology to test two hypotheses.  The main empirical results and their implications are 
discussed in Section 4, while the last section provides the concluding remarks. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since Akerlof (1970) showed that some costly actions can mitigate the inefficiency arising 
from asymmetric information, the signaling idea has been applied to explain many phenomena 
in the financial market.  First, when there is asymmetric information between insiders and 
outsiders of a firm, capital structure may signal a firm’s unobserved quality or earnings (Leland 
and Pyle, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Second, it has been argued that offering more 
dividends may serve as a signal for a firm’s higher unobserved quality (Bhattacharya, 1979; 
Brickley, 1983), although the empirical evidence is not always consistent (Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989; Ofer and Siegel, 1987).  Third, delays in converting convertible debt can 
signal a firm’s good quality (Harris and Raviv, 1985; Ofer and Natarajan, 1987).   
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Similar to the above literature, our study treats information asymmetry between a firm 
and prospective investors as an important real-world constraint that affects a firm’s decision.  
In particular, we put forward that IPO location is another signaling device that a firm can use 
to reveal its unobserved quality.  This has received theoretical support from Cheung and Lee 
(1995) and Fuerst (1998), who justified the preference for listing on a foreign stock exchange 
with a more stringent regulatory environment.  However, empirical studies were scant, except 
these two: Blass and Yafeh (2001) found that high quality firms in Israel were more likely to 
conduct IPOs in the US than in Tel Aviv, whereas Yang and Lau (2010) showed that foreign 
firms conducing IPOs in the US did not show long-term underperformance. 7  Our study 
provides a much cleaner empirical test of the signaling effect on IPO locations because we are 
comparing two stock markets in close proximity within one country.  The Hong Kong and 
mainland markets are the most popular places for mainland firms to go public and yet have 
very distinct regulatory systems. 
Our further test of the signaling idea is also highly relevant to the IPO underpricing 
literature.  While IPO underpricing has been examined by a lot of empirical studies (Ibbotson, 
1975; Ritter, 1984; Ritter, 1991; Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter, 1988; Kennedy et al., 2006), no 
attempt was made to study IPO underpricing in different IPO locations.  Our test will build on 
the signaling argument that a high quality firm should signal its quality by underpricing its IPO 
shares and recoup the cost of this signal after the stock market has confirmed its good quality 
(Welch, 1989, Allen and Faulhaber, 1989, and Chemmanur, 1993).  The degree of underpricing 
should depend on how much information asymmetry a market exhibits.  This contrasts with 
Tian’s (2011) argument that mainland IPO underpricing was mainly caused by government 
intervention.  Our findings would also contribute to the literature on corporate governance in 
                                                          
7 Cross-listings have been widely examined in the literature (Merton, 1987; Baker et al, 2002; Reese and Weisbach, 
2002; Doidge, 2004; etc.), but they are less relevant to our study which deals with a firm’s first IPO location 
choice. 
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emerging markets, such as that of China (Gao, 2002; Fung, Lee, and Leung, 2000; Newell et 
al., 2005; Chau et al., 2009). 
3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 HYPOTHESES 
Since Akerlof’s (1970) seminal paper, many studies have applied the idea of asymmetric 
information to explain different phenomena in the financial markets.  In line with the theoretical 
analysis of Cheung and Lee (1995), Fuerst (1998), Blass and Yafeh (2001), Yang and Lau 
(2010), we posit that firms with higher unobserved quality are more likely to conduct IPOs in 
a stock market with less information asymmetry in order to signal their better quality.  As 
discussed in Introduction, information in Hong Kong’s stock market is less asymmetric than 
that in mainland China’s because the former has a more mature legal system with stringent 
listing rules and enforcement.  In particular, the strict requirements of information disclosure 
and due diligence in Hong Kong impose a higher cost to lower quality firms.  These conditions 
make a separating equilibrium possible and leads to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with higher unobserved quality are more likely to conduct IPOs in 
Hong Kong than in mainland China. 
Another implication (or benefit) from using IPO location as a quality signal is that firms 
with higher unobserved quality should enjoy a higher IPO offer price in Hong Kong than in 
mainland China.  However, none of the firms in our sample had dual listings, so this implication 
can only be indirectly tested through examining their underpricing ratios.  According to the 
IPO underpricing literature (e.g., Welch, 1989; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Boulton et al., 2011), 
a good quality firm may use IPO underpricing to reveal its unobserved quality when there exists 
asymmetric information between firms and investors.  Give that the Hong Kong stock market 
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has a more mature legal system with stringent listing rules and enforcement, there should be 
less asymmetric information in Hong Kong than in mainland China.  We therefore expect more 
underpricing in the latter as stated in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The degree of IPO underpricing in mainland China is larger than that in 
Hong Kong. 
3.2 DATA 
We targeted firms that: 1) were floated on the mainland or Hong Kong stock exchanges 
from 1992 to 2008 and 2) had their core business in the mainland (not Hong Kong) real estate 
market three years before and after their IPOs.  We collected IPOs up to 2008 in order to allow 
sufficient post-IPO data for analysis.  The focus on real estate enables us to use property price 
indices to account for any change in property market sentiment that may affect a firm’s IPO 
location choice.  However, a few real estate firms that had highly diversified business during 
their IPOs (e.g. China Vanke) were excluded.  Our final sample contained 57 real estate firms: 
29 listed in mainland China and 28 in Hong Kong. 
For each firm in the data set, we collected data on their characteristics for the three years 
before and after their IPOs.  Pre-IPO firm characteristics, such as asset size, annual profits, 
state ownership, and capital structure, were identified from IPO prospectuses.  Post-IPO firm 
characteristics were collected from various sources.  First, market information, such as stock 
prices and exchange rates, was obtained from DataStream.  Second, we extracted operational 
performances, such as total assets, liabilities, and profits, from the annual reports of each firm.  
The data will be used to construct ex post measures of firm performance, which are used as 
proxies for a firm’s unobserved quality before IPOs.  All data dominated in Hong Kong Dollars 
was converted into RMB. 
10 
  
To control for the direct property market conditions in mainland China, we used the 
property price index constructed by DTZ, a major international property consultancy in Asia.  
It is a valuation-based index measuring residential and commercial property price trends in 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, which are the four most well developed real 
estate markets in mainland China. 
 
3.3 MODEL ON IPO LOCATION CHOICE 
To test Hypothesis 1, we used abnormal stock and profit returns as proxies for a firm’s 
unobserved quality.  Intuitively, as long as the capital market is weakly efficient, stock prices 
should reflect any public information on a firm, while private information would not be 
revealed to investors until after these firms have demonstrated their superior performance.  
Given this logic, we developed a two-step approach to analyzing IPO location choice. 
First, we constructed three different proxies for a firm’s unobserved quality: 8 
1) Abnormal profit returns: we ran a regression across firms with post-IPO returns on 
assets (ROA) against several determinants of operational performance, including state 
ownership, post-IPO gearing ratio, and post-IPO property market return.  Post-IPO ROA is the 
average annual income per total assets during the three years after the IPO.  It is a measure of 
a firm’s gross operating performance.  State ownership is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
firm is state-owned and 0 if otherwise.  It captures any performance difference between state 
and privately owned firms.  Post-IPO gearing ratio is the average liabilities/assets ratio in the 
three years after the IPO.  It controls for any effect of capital structure on operating performance.  
                                                          
8 These ex post performance measures may contain measurement errors and cause estimation bias in 
subsequent regression analysis.  Nevertheless, they are the best measures available, as pre‐IPO data is limited 
and reliable ex ante measures cannot be constructed. 
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Post-IPO property market return is measured from the DTZ property price index.  It controls 
for performance difference due to market-wide changes in the property price level within three 
years after the IPO.  The residuals from the regression are defined as the abnormal profit return, 
which represents a firm’s operating performance relative to its peers. 
2) Sharpe ratio: it is a standard measure of abnormal returns, which is defined as: 
݄ܵܽݎ݌݁	ܴܽݐ݅݋ ൌ ܯ݁ܽ݊	݋݂	ሺr െ ݎெሻ	ܵݐܽ݊݀ܽݎ݀	ܦ݁ݒ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊	݋݂	ሺr െ ݎெሻ	 
where ݎ is the firm’s stock return and ݎெ is the return of a benchmark portfolio.  The mean and 
standard deviation are based on monthly stock returns of each firm in the three years following 
its IPO.  Since the firms are listed in different stock markets, we used two different benchmark 
portfolios: (1) the monthly returns of the stock market in which the firm is listed; (2) the 
weighted monthly returns of all three stock market indices (Hong Kong, Shanghai, and 
Shenzhen), with the respective total market value as the weight.  We also adjusted the market 
value by the corresponding exchange rate between the HKD and RMB. 
3) Jensen’s ߙ : it is another standard measure of abnormal returns used in the finance 
literature.  A conventional way to calculate it is based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM).  We ran the following regression for each firm using its monthly stock returns within 
three years after its IPO: 
ݎ െ ݎ௙ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ൫ݎெ െ ݎ௙൯ (1) 
where ݎ௙ is the risk free rate, ߚ is the firm’s beta, and ߙ is Jensen’s ߙ.  In the calculation, we 
used the interest rate of a three-month bank deposit as the risk-free rate.  Similar to the 
construction of the Sharpe Ratio, we used the monthly returns of the corresponding stock 
market index and the weighted monthly returns of all three stock market indices respectively 
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as the benchmark portfolio. 
In the second step, we applied the Probit model to explain IPO location choice by each of 
the above proxies for unobserved quality and other control variables: 
ܲݎ݋ܾሺܯ ൌ 1|ܺሻ ൌ ∅ሺߠܺሻ  (2) 
where M is an IPO location dummy, which equals 1 if a firm is listed in mainland China and 0 
if it is listed in Hong Kong; ∅ is the cumulative density function of the standard normal 
distribution; θ is a vector of the coefficients to be estimated; and	X is a vector that includes the 
proxy for unobserved quality as well as a set of control variables.   
Our key interest is the coefficient of unobserved firm quality variable.  According to 
Hypothesis 1, this coefficient should be negative if firms with better unobserved quality are 
more likely to conduct their IPOs in Hong Kong than in mainland China.   
Three control variables in Equation (2) are the observed firm characteristics that could 
affect a firm’s IPO location choices.  First, the average ROA for each firm during the three 
years before its IPO (pre-IPO profit return) is used to control for the observed operating 
performance of each firm.  If asymmetric information exists, such information is deemed less 
reliable by investors and may have limited influence on a firm’s IPO location choice.  Second, 
the average liabilities/assets ratio during the three years before IPO (pre-IPO gearing ratio) 
measures the capital structure of each firm.  A highly levered firm that needs flexibility in 
subsequent fund-raising activities may prefer Hong Kong because of its better access to global 
funds and the absence of capital or exchange control.  On the other hand, the use of debt could 
be a positive signal of firm quality and reduce the marginal benefit of listing in a reputable 
market.  Third, whether a firm is a state or privately owned is captured by a state ownership 
dummy.  State-owned enterprises may prefer listing in the mainland market of which the 
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government has better control. 
Another control variable is related to stock market sentiment.  When choosing their IPO 
locations, firms may compare the Hong Kong and mainland stock markets and prefer a location 
with relatively better stock market performance.  Thus, we further control for the relative 
performance of the stock markets in Hong Kong and mainland China by using a variable 
measuring the return difference between the two markets in the year before IPO (stock market 
relative return). 
The final control variable is the growth of the property price index (Property market 
return).  We expect that when the direct property market performs well, firms are more likely 
to conduct IPOs in mainland China instead of in Hong Kong.  The reason is one of information 
discovery: local investors in mainland China can obtain first-hand information about the direct 
market more accurately and more quickly through most recent property transactions or local 
real estate agents.  Such information is usually not directly available to foreign (including Hong 
Kong’s) investors until after some time when such information is aggregated and disseminated 
as a market report or price index.  When prices in the direct market are rising, local investors 
know first and are more willing to buy stocks of real estate firms than foreign investors.  On 
the other hand, when prices in the direct market are dropping, local investors know first and 
show less interest in buying stocks of real estate firms than foreign investors.  Therefore, we 
use the growth of the property price index in the two years before IPO to control for effects 
arising from information discovery through the direct market.  A higher growth rate should 
induce firms to conduct IPOs in mainland China. 
3.4 MODEL ON IPO UNDERPRICING 
As discussed in the Hypotheses section, firms with higher unobserved quality should 
enjoy a higher IPO offer price in Hong Kong than in mainland China.  At the same time, firms 
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may also use IPO underpricing to signal unobserved quality to potential investors.  Both 
arguments imply, ceteris paribus, greater IPO underpricing in mainland China where the 
problem of information asymmetry is more serious.  As is standard in the literature, 
underpricing is measured by this ratio: 
Underpricing ratio ൌ Closing Price െ Offer Price
Offer Price
 
where the offer price is the price set by each firm before listing and the closing price is 
the closing stock price on the listing day.  A higher underpricing ratio means the shares are 
initially underpriced by the firm. 
After defining the underpricing ratio, we used the following regression model to test 
Hypothesis 2: 
ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃	ݎܽݐ݅݋ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܯ ൅ ߛܼ    (3) 
where ܯ is the mainland dummy as defined before and Z is a vector of control variables.  
According to Hypothesis 2, the coefficient of M is positive if the magnitude of underpricing is 
larger in the mainland market.   
Z in Equation (3) contains five control variables, some of which have been defined before.  
First, a state ownership dummy is used to control for the performance uncertainty associated 
with state-owned enterprises, which may be less operationally efficient but enjoy a closer 
relationship with the government.  Whether its coefficient should be positive or negative is an 
empirical question.  Second, pre-IPO gearing ratio could be taken as a signal of firm quality 
because according to the pecking order theory, firms with positive net present value projects 
should have preferred debt financing before issuing equity.  Moreover, more debts would 
reduce free cash flow and alleviate the agency problem between shareholders and the manager.  
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A firm with more debts should thus underprice less.  Third, stock market return before IPO 
controls for the stock market conditions a month before listing, which may affect how the firm 
sets its offer price.  Better pre-IPO market conditions should enable the firm to set a higher 
offer price and hence a lower underpricing ratio.  Fourth, stock market return on the IPO day 
controls for stock market conditions on the listing date.  Better market conditions on the IPO 
day should raise the closing price as well as the underpricing ratio.  Finally, abnormal profit 
return, Sharpe ratio, and Jensen’s ߙ, as described in Section 3.3, are used separately to control 
for unobserved firm quality. To signal their unobserved quality to investors, high quality firms 
should underprice more than low quality firms.  However, these performance variables may be 
correlated with a firm’s IPO location (M), if Hypothesis 1 is correct.  We will run regressions 
based on Equation (3) with and without these proxies to check robustness.  
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 PRELIMINARY STATISTICS 
Before presenting the regression results, we first compare the descriptive statistics of the 
mainland developers listed in mainland China and Hong Kong.  Table 1 shows their post-IPO 
performance measured by the profit return, abnormal profit return, Sharpe ratio, and Jensen’s 
ߙ.  Developers listed in the mainland (0.0714) had a higher mean profit return than those listed 
in Hong Kong (0.0616).  However, on the basis of mean abnormal profit return and Sharpe 
ratio where risk factors are adjusted, Hong Kong-listed developers outperformed the mainland-
listed ones.  In particular, the mean abnormal profit return of mainland-listed developers was 
negative (-0.0020), compared to a positive value of 0.0025 for the Hong Kong-listed ones.  
Listings in Hong Kong also showed a higher mean Sharpe ratio, especially based on the 
weighted stock market indices.  The results from Jensen’s ߙ are mixed, depending on whether 
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the weighted or un-weighted version of the stock market indices is used.  Nevertheless, the 
difference in mean Jensen’s ߙ is quite small, as compared to its standard deviation.  On the 
basis of unconditional mean (without controlling for other determinants of IPO location), we 
find no clear pattern that mainland or Hong Kong-listed developers had consistently better 
post-IPO performance.  
Table 2 shows the degree of IPO underpricing of developers based the underpricing ratio.  
The average underpricing ratio of developers listed in mainland China (4.9552) was much 
larger than that in Hong Kong (0.117).  An excessively high underpricing ratio in the mainland 
is consistent with findings in other studies and explainable by state ownership, high risk of new 
issues, and investment opportunities (e.g. Mok and Hui, 1998; Su and Fleisher, 1999). 
Descriptive statistics of the control variables used in Equations (2) and (3) are shown in 
Table 3.  Mainland-listed developers had higher average profit return, both pre and post-IPO, 
than Hong Kong-listed developers; yet, IPO appears to worsen the former’s operating 
performance while improving the latter’s.  Mainland-listed developers had lower average 
gearing ratios than the Hong Kong’s counterparts, and both reduced their leverage after IPO.  
The mainland property market generally performed better when developers chose to list in the 
mainland than when they were listed in Hong Kong.  The same is true for stock market returns 
both before IPO and on the listing day.  All these firm and market characteristics will be 
controlled for when we analyze IPO location choices and IPO underpricing. 
4.2 DETERMINANTS OF IPO LOCATION 
To test Hypothesis 1, we used the probit model in Equation (2) to explain firms’ IPO 
location by each proxy for unobserved firm quality and other possible determinants, including 
pre-IPO profit return, pre-IPO gearing ratio, state ownership, stock market relative return, and 
property market return.  Table 4 presents the results using the abnormal profit return as the 
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proxy for unobserved quality, whereas Table 5 presents the results using the Sharpe ratio and 
Jensen’s ߙ .  No matter which proxy is used, the results are indeed highly similar.  The 
McFadden R2 is above 60% in all cases. 
First, and most importantly, the coefficients of all the proxies for unobserved firm quality, 
including the abnormal profit return, Sharpe ratio and Jensen’s ߙ, are negative and significant 
at the 5% level.  That is, controlling for other IPO location determinants, developers with better 
unobserved quality were more likely to conduct IPOs in Hong Kong instead of mainland China.  
This confirms Hypothesis 1, which posits that there exists asymmetric information between 
firms and investors and conducting IPOs in Hong Kong may serve as a positive signal for 
unobserved firm quality.  As mentioned before, the Hong Kong stock exchange has more 
stringent information disclosure requirements and law enforcement such that low quality firms 
would find it too costly to imitate high quality firms in floating their shares in Hong Kong.  
Low quality firms would rather conduct their IPOs in mainland China to prevent revelation of 
too much information.  Note that the use of different benchmark portfolios for Sharpe ratio and 
Jensen’s ߙ only changes the coefficients slightly, while their sign and significance remain the 
same. 
Second, property market return (before IPO) is an important determinant of IPO location, 
as its coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level in all cases.  That is, when the 
mainland property market performed well, developers tended to conduct IPOs in mainland 
China instead of in Hong Kong.  This is because local investors in mainland China, who have 
direct access to changing local property market conditions, would adjust their valuation of a 
developer’s IPO more quickly than foreign investors.  Local investors’ direct access could come 
from their direct participation in trading properties or the most recent transactions reported by 
real estate agents and local news.  In contrast, most foreign investors could only rely on 
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aggregate and delayed information from market reports.  As a result, when the property market 
turns good, developers prefer to list in mainland China so as to take advantage of local investors’ 
higher valuation.  Likewise, when the property market turns bad, developers tend to list in 
Hong Kong to enjoy foreign investors’ higher valuation of their shares.  
The third important determinant of IPO location is pre-IPO gearing ratio, whose 
coefficient is negative and highly significant in all cases.  As mentioned before, developers 
with a higher level of debt may prefer to list in Hong Kong because an easy access to global 
capital and the absence of exchange control can give them greater flexibility in any subsequent 
fund-raising activities, e.g., to repay the debt or finance new projects.  This flexibility 
apparently outweighed any signaling benefit from the use of debt when developers chose their 
IPO locations. 
The fourth determinant is state ownership.  In all cases, its coefficient is positive and 
significant, indicating that state-owned developers were more likely to conduct IPOs in the 
mainland stock market.  This could be due to two reasons.  Politically, listing in the mainland 
allows the Chinese Government to have more control over their companies.  Another argument 
for listing in the mainland is that foreign investors may be less familiar with the political 
structure of state-owned enterprises and tend to undervalue the shares of these companies. 
Two control variables, namely pre-IPO profit return and stock market relative return, are 
found not significant.  The insignificance of the pre-IPO profit return actually reinforces our 
argument that asymmetric information exists and a high profit return does not necessarily imply 
good firm quality.  Unobserved quality is revealed not by pre-IPO profit returns but by the IPO 
location.  The insignificance of stock market relative return suggests that the performance 
difference between the Hong Kong and mainland stock markets did not matter in the choice of 
IPO location.  One possible reason is that movements of the two markets were highly correlated, 
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especially in the past decade.   
4.3 DETERMINANTS OF IPO UNDERPRICING 
To test Hypothesis 2, we used the regression model in Equation (3) to explain firms’ 
underpricing ratio by their IPO locations and other possible determinants, including pre-IPO 
gearing ratio, stock market return before IPO, stock market return on the IPO day, state 
ownership, and the three proxies of unobserved firm quality.  Table 6 presents the results, all 
with an R2 value of approximately 30%.  The results are similar irrespective of whether 
unobserved quality is included and which proxy of unobserved quality is used.   
As expected, the coefficient of the mainland dummy is positive and significant, 
confirming Hypothesis 2 that mainland-listed developers showed a larger degree of IPO 
underpricing than Hong Kong-listed developers.  This comes as a reward to good quality firms 
that invested in location signaling.  At the same time, the stringent requirements in the Hong 
Kong stock market also make information more symmetric, so firms listed in Hong Kong do 
not have to greatly underprice their shares in order to signal quality.  In contrast, in a market 
where information is less symmetric, mainland-listed firms have to rely on underpricing to 
distinguish between firms.  
The second determinant of IPO underpricing is pre-IPO gearing ratio.  Its coefficient is 
negative and significant, indicating that developers with more leverage underpriced less during 
their IPOs.  This is consistent with the use of debts (as opposed to equity) to convey a positive 
signal to investors, which allows firms with more debts to underprice less. 
The third determinant is the stock market return in the month before IPO.  Its negative and 
significant coefficient shows that developers underpriced less when the stock market performed 
well prior to IPO.  Observing a growing stock market, a higher offer price is set, resulting in a 
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lower underpricing ratio. 
The remaining three control variables are not significant.  The stock market return on the 
IPO day had little impact on the underpricing ratio, probably because the stock market return 
before IPO has already captured most of the market risk during the IPO process.  The 
insignificance of the state ownership dummy can be interpreted as a tradeoff between 
uncertainty in state-owned enterprises’ operational efficiency and their superior role in 
controlling state resources.  The proxies of unobserved quality, namely abnormal profit return, 
Sharpe ratio, and Jensen’s ߙ, are not significantly associated with the underpricing ratio.  This 
does not mean that underpricing does not reveal unobserved quality; rather, the effect of the 
unobserved quality proxies might have been taken away by the location dummy, as a significant 
relationship between them was established in Hypothesis 1.  Suffice it to say is that IPO 
location has adequately captured the unobserved quality that is needed to explain IPO 
underpricing. 
5 CONCLUSION 
We investigated how developers use IPO location to reveal their unobserved quality and 
how IPO location affects the degree of IPO underpricing.  By using post-IPO abnormal stock 
returns (the Sharpe ratio and Jensen’s ߙ ) and abnormal profit returns as the proxies for 
unobserved quality, we found that higher quality firms were more likely to conduct their IPOs 
in Hong Kong rather than mainland China.  This is consistent with the signaling theory – good 
firms tend to signal their quality in a stock market with more stringent rules so that other firms 
cannot imitate.  In addition, we found that better local property market performance, lower 
leverage, and state ownership, were significant factors driving developers to list in the mainland 
instead of Hong Kong.   
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A further test on IPO underpricing reveals that mainland-listed developers underpriced 
their shares more than Hong Kong-listed developers.  This is again consistent with the signaling 
theory – firms listed in a more symmetric information environment like Hong Kong’s need not 
greatly underprice their shares in order to signal quality.  Other determinants of IPO 
underpricing were gearing ratio and stock market performance. 
Due to our small sample size, it is not possible to further test if IPO location goes beyond 
a pure quality signal (Spence, 1973) by adding ex post productivity to a firm.  While the 
descriptive statistics in Table 2 reveal a growth of profit returns for firms listed in Hong Kong 
but not for those listed in the mainland, the differences were not significant.  A longer sample 
period is needed to capture any productivity increase after IPO, which we have to leave for 
further search. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of post-IPO performance 
 Mean Standard deviation 
 Mainland Hong Kong Mainland Hong Kong 
Profit return  0.0714 0.0616 0.0421 0.0199 
Abnormal profit return  -0.0020 0.0025 0.0328 0.0195 
Sharpe ratio (UW) 0.0297 0.0347 0.1649 0.1269 
Sharpe ratio (W) -2.47E-05 0.0182 0.1701 0.0920 
Jensen’s α  (UW) 0.0066 0.0059 0.0158 0.0205 
Jensen’s α (W) 0.0068 0.0070 0.0189 0.0194 
1. Profit return is the post-IPO ROA, whereas abnormal profit return is the residual from a cross-sectional 
regression of post-IPO ROA on state ownership, post-IPO gearing ratio, and post-IPO property market returns
(see Section 3.3). 
2. “UW” and “W” refer to the use of different benchmark portfolios.  “UW” uses the (un-weighted) stock market 
index in which the firm is listed.  “W” uses the weighted average index of all three stock exchanges (Hong Kong, 
Shanghai, and Shenzhen) where the respective total market capitalization is taken as the weight. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of IPO underpricing 
  Mean  Standard deviation 
 Mainland Hong Kong Mainland Hong Kong 
 Underpricing ratio 4.9552 0.117 7.2956 0.3907 
1. Underpricing ratio is the percentage difference between the first-day closing price and the IPO offer price 
(see Section 3.4). 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the firm and market characteristics 
  Mean Standard deviation 
  Mainland Hong Kong Mainland Hong Kong 
Pre-IPO profit return 0.0736 0.0596 0.0389 0.0405 
Post-IPO profit return 0.0714 0.0616 0.0421 0.0199 
Pre-IPO gearing ratio 0.5532 0.7599 0.1661 0.1463 
Post-IPO gearing ratio 0.4733 0.5354 0.1461 0.1427 
Property market return (before IPO) 0.1272 0.0643 0.1424 0.0870 
Stock market return (before IPO) 0.0709 0.0314 0.1392 0.0773 
Stock market return (on the IPO day) 0.0088 0.0003 0.0324 0.0148 
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Table 4: IPO location and abnormal profit returns 
 Prob(M = 1) 
Abnormal profit return -34.6525 
(-2.0281)** 
[-2.8980]*** 
Property market return 13.2256 
(2.8266)*** 
[2.3930]** 
Stock market relative return 0.6273 
(1.0308) 
[1.1488] 
Pre-IPO profit return 1.4486 
(0.1749) 
[0.2290] 
Pre-IPO gearing ratio -8.7422 
(-2.9953)*** 
[-3.2571]*** 
State ownership dummy  2.0171 
(2.8334)*** 
[2.3067]** 
Constant 4.0952 
(2.0097) ** 
[2.2632] ** 
 
McFadden R2 
Percent correctly predicted 
  
0.6059 
91.1 
1. This table reports the estimation for Equation (2): ܲݎ݋ܾሺܯ ൌ 1|ܺሻ ൌ ∅ሺߠܺሻ, where ∅ is 
the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, M is the mainland 
dummy (mainland=1; Hong Kong=0) and X is a vector that includes the proxy for 
unobserved quality and other control variables. 
2. The z-statistics are presented in parentheses, and the White heteroskedasticity-robust z-
statistics are presented in squared brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
3. We tested for multicollinearity using the variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis 
developed by Neter et al. (1996).  In all regressions, the magnitude of the VIF is less than 
5, implying no significant parameter distortion caused by multicollinearity.  
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Table 5: IPO location and abnormal stock returns 
Prob(M=1) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Sharpe ratio (UW) 
 
-6.7291 
   (-2.0800)** 
[-2.5854]*** 
Sharpe ratio (W) 
  
-6.5762 
  (-2.0323)** 
[-2.4381]** 
Jensen’s alpha (UW) 
   
-32.2258 
 (-2.1460)** 
[-2.0031]** 
Jensen’s alpha (W) 
    
-40.0831 
(-2.3284)** 
[-2.6861]** * 
Property market return 16.6829 15.5585 12.5575 13.7193 
(2.5213)** 
[2.7552]*** 
(2.5426)** 
[2.8315]** 
(2.4094)** 
[2.2501]** 
(2.4991)** 
[2.4275]** 
Stock market relative return 1.0519 0.5381 0.5183 0.4776 
(1.2281) 
[1.3356] 
(0.7705) 
[0.7417] 
(0.7517) 
[0.7383] 
(0.6734) 
[0.6643] 
Pre-IPO profit return 5.5526 2.754 1.5425 2.8 
(0.5389) 
[0.6812] 
(0.2812) 
[0.3574] 
(0.1607) 
[0.2378] 
(0.2830) 
[0.4012] 
Pre-IPO gearing ratio -8.7944 -9.1075 -9.4372 -9.9801 
(-2.5815)*** 
[-3.6155]*** 
(-2.6262)*** 
[-3.6513]*** 
(-3.0612)*** 
[-3.7232]*** 
(-2.9037)*** 
[-3.7788]*** 
State ownership dummy 2.0969 2.282 1.8145 2.1722 
(2.5841)*** 
[2.9141]*** 
(2.5776)*** 
[3.1640]*** 
(2.6438)*** 
[2.5822]*** 
(2.7398)*** 
[3.0994]*** 
Constant 4.301 4.3645 5.1525 5.3408 
(1.7783) ** 
[2.4714]** 
(1.8344) ** 
[2.4528]** 
(2.3173) *** 
[3.1040] *** 
(2.2009) *** 
[3.0039] *** 
 
McFadden R2 
Percent correctly predicted 
 
0.6437 
88.9 
 
0.6317 
86.7 
 
0.6088 
88.9 
 
0.6398 
91.1 
1. This table reports the estimation for Equation (2): ܲݎ݋ܾሺܯ ൌ 1|ܺሻ ൌ ∅ሺߠܺሻ, where ∅ is the cumulative 
density function of the standard normal distribution, M is the mainland dummy (mainland=1; Hong Kong=0) and 
X is a vector that includes the proxy for unobserved quality and other control variables. 
2. The z-statistics are presented in parentheses, and the White heteroskedasticity-robust z-statistics are presented 
in squared brackets.  Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
3. We tested for multicollinearity using the variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis developed by Neter et al.
(1996).  In all regressions, the magnitude of the VIF is less than 5, implying no significant parameter distortion 
caused by multicollinearity. 
4. “UW” and “W” refer to the use of different benchmark portfolios.  “UW” uses the (un-weighted) stock market 
index in which the firm is listed.  “W” uses the weighted average index of all three stock exchanges (Hong Kong, 
Shanghai, and Shenzhen) where the respective total market capitalization is taken as the weight. 
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Table 6: Initial underpricing and IPO location 
Underpricing ratio (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Mainland dummy (M) 3.1455 
(2.0428)** 
3.1299 
(1.9867)* 
3.1791 
(2.0322)** 
3.1717 
(2.0234)** 
Pre-IPO gearing ratio -7.8708 
(-2.0506)** 
-7.8992 
(-1.9959)* 
-7.8786 
(-2.0315)** 
-7.8143 
(-2.0035)* 
Stock market return before IPO -11.4247 
(-1.9613)* 
-11.4217 
(-1.8875)* 
-11.6182 
(-1.9491)* 
-11.5018 
(-1.9451)* 
Stock market return on the IPO 
day 
-7.6875 
(-0.3144) 
-7.2221 
(0.2877) 
-8.0810 
(-0.3262) 
-7.807 
(-0.3158) 
State ownership dummy -0.2834 
(-0.2198) 
-0.3018 
(-0.2279) 
-0.2878 
(-0.2209) 
-0.2878 
(-0.2208) 
Abnormal profit return  
 -4.0400 (-0.1260) 
  
Sharpe ratio (UW) 
   
0.8562 
(0.2047) 
 
Jensen’s alpha (UW) 
   
 4.6654 
(0.1387) 
Constant 6.5714 
(2.1552)** 
6.6222 
(2.1132)** 
6.5420 
(2.1213)** 
6.4950 
(2.0750)** 
 
R2 
 
0.3081 
 
0.3057 
 
0.3088 
 
0.3084 
Adjusted-R2 0.2345 0.2131 0.2186 0.2182 
1. This table reports the estimation for Equation (3): ܷ݊݀݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃ ݎܽݐ݅݋ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܯ ൅ ߛܼ where M is the 
mainland dummy (mainland=1; Hong Kong=0) and Z is a vector of control variables. 
2. The OLS t-Statistics are presented in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated 
by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
3. All the regressions have passed the tests on multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. 
4. “UW” refers to the use of the (un-weighted) stock market index in which the firm is listed as the benchmark 
portfolio. 
 
 
 
 
